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THE AUSTRALASIAN PRODUCE COOPERATIVE:
A GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECT
Hans Lehmann
School of Information Management
Victoria University of Wellington
Hans.Lehmann@vuw.ac.nz

ABSTRACT
This case describes how the Australasian Produce Co-Operative1 (APCO), a marketing cooperative in a land-based industry in ‘Australasia’ attempted to create a global information
system. APCO is among the 20 largest food enterprises in the world. Information systems took
on increasing importance as the enterprise refined its global operations in the last decade. In the
six years between 1996 and 2002, this case demonstrates the many pitfalls in the process of
evolving an international information system as it follows APCO’s global system development. It
shows the difficulties surrounding the definition of requirements in a large multinational firm and
how such a definition is intertwined with the pre-existing politically charged environment that
characterizes the global firm. Further, the case demonstrates how the failure of the information
technology department to interpret correctly the organization’s strategy changes resulted in
antagonistic forces in which business resistance finally defeated all attempts to install a standard
global information system.
Keywords: international information systems implementation, multinational companies, politics
in multinational companies, international project management, business strategy for multinational
companies, information systems strategy for multinational companies

Editor’s Note: Faculty members who are listed in the IS Faculty Directory, located on the Web at
http://www.isfacdir.org/default.htm can send an e-mail to the author (Hans.Lehmann@vuw.ac.nz)
requesting the teaching note that accompanies this case.
PREFACE
Chris MacElroy smiled wearily at the stewardess as she cleared away the remnants of dinner and
started to unpack the project documentation his PA had dropped into his battered briefcase
before he left for Europe again – the third time in the last six weeks. The meeting he was going
to chair in London would be critical. It would determine the future (or not…) of their global

1
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information technology project, which, over five years, roundly failed to produce any systems that
were considered useful for their business.
He was thoroughly sick of traveling: only a week ago the executive team finished a global round
of presentations to show-case the first annual report of the newly re-structured enterprise, which
was successful way beyond expectations: Revenue showed double-digit growth to more than
$7bn2 – which now puts the Australasian Produce Co-Operative (APCO) firmly among the top ten
global firms in their specific branch of agribusiness.
Everything was going exceedingly well – but for the “Food Information Systems & Technology”
(FIST) project. He looked at the project timeline which was the first item in his project file.3 Started
with great fireworks in 1997, FIST was supposed to deliver state-of-the-art international systems
by 2000. Alas, by that time one pilot system project had already been abandoned as unworkable;
another was bogged down in bitter controversy; and software and hardware, selected in 1998 on
the basis of a ‘benchmark’ study, were proving to be inadequate. By 2001 all the major regional
subsidiaries refused FIST as dysfunctional. Now, in 2003, it was only a tiny office in Central Asia
where any progress at all was made – at a cost of $25m so far. Moreover, not only did FIST fail
to find common systems requirements, but the resulting controversies caused bruising political
infighting to the point where essential business co-operation was endangered. Following a
damning consultants’ review of the project in late 2002, the CEO pulled the plug on FIST
altogether – although, for reasons of shareholder politics, this action was announced as a
‘refocusing review of the project scope ’.
How could they be so successful in their business and so hapless when it comes to information
technology? Chris closed the fat file and leaned back to reflect.
I. BACKGROUND
The marketing authorities for land-based industries (such as fruit growers, meat producers, dairy
farmers, and forestry) started at the beginning of the last century as local co-operative producer
associations. Over the decades they merged until, by the 1960’s, they were national bodies who
4
now increasingly managed all exports of their members. APCO , moreover, was protected by
legislation which prohibited any other organization in their industry from trading in international
markets. This legislation was seen as essential for maintaining a ‘critical mass’ in international
markets, where APCO competes with giants such as Nestlé, which is nearly five times its size.
Australasia’s 25,000 primary producers were organized into 38 co-operative ‘Production
Companies’ (ProdCos), in which they held shares in proportion to their production. APCO
segmented their food products business into three main markets: branded fast-moving-consumergoods (FMCG), ingredients for industrial food manufacturers, and semi-manufactured food
products sold to restaurant companies such as McDonalds and Burger King.
With about a quarter of its raw materials sourced from outside Australasia, and 35 manufacturing
plants in other countries in addition to the 25 inside Australasia, APCO soon began to regard
itself as a mature global operator. Structured into nine regional holding companies with 185
offices, in 2003 it operated in some 140 countries, obtaining more than half of its revenue from
developing countries. Marketing, sales, and logistics, APCO’s traditional strength, were now
often complemented by the manufacturing of branded goods at the local level. The sophistication

2

All money references are in USD

3

The project timeline is included with this case as Appendix I.

4

APCO included both Australia and New Zealand, the two countries that, together with Papua
New Guinea, Tasmania and a host of small islands make up the Australasian region.
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of their operations increasingly covered a wide spectrum from small, primitive, and manual to
large, high-tech, and fully computerized.
A BRIEF HISTORY
Prior to the mid 1970s APCO exported the vast majority of its produce to the United Kingdom,
who, under Commonwealth rules, used to accept it all. Once the UK joined the European Union,
however, they were required to cut APCO’s quota severely. This change brought the primary
producers to the brink of ruin. In emergency mode, APCO rapidly set up offices around the globe
with a simple mandate: “Do whatever you like, but sell!”
This policy of far-reaching local autonomy was successful. Within a decade the Co-op built a
presence in more than thirty countries. Moreover, they also managed, throughout, to secure a
satisfactory return for all their primary producers.
By the mid-90s, however, the emergence of global brands (such as Coca Cola and McDonalds)
forced APCO to develop global brands themselves. For that, it needed to have sufficient
command and control to mount synchronized international marketing and logistics operations. In
early 1996 a new Chief Executive Officer began a vigorous campaign to shift the necessary
authority back to head-office, but with a clear vision of balancing central control with local
flexibility.
Information systems were seen as an essential element of the new strategic vision. During the
1970s and early ‘80s, APCO built up a sizeable IS department with a mainframe operation at the
head office, linking up with all the main subsidiary offices and ProdCos throughout Australasia.
The forced expansion drive in the 1980s, however, led to an increased need by the local
operations overseas to be supported with information systems. By the mid 1990s most regional
offices owned computers, networks, and application software to suit their own, individual
requirements. Compatibility with head-office and with one another was often a problem. In 1996
this proliferation of loosely, if at all, co-ordinated local information systems stood in some contrast
to the declared will from APCO’s head office to impose more central control over the enterprise
as a whole. As a response, the IS Department at APCO’s head office established a “Standard for
Information Systems”5, declaring the intent to impose common global standards governing the
application and deployment of information technology throughout APCO’s operating companies
worldwide.
II. THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECT
In December 1996, encouraged by the new CEO’s interest, this standards framework was
extended to become the “Charter” for the “Food Information Systems and Technology (FIST)”
project, charged with the specific objective to develop and implement common information
standards, technology platforms, and global information systems for all APCO operations.
APCO’s Board formally ratified the FIST project in January 1997. The IS department
consequently assembled a team, initially 11 people, all with long and good service records. The
team stayed relatively intact and at this size throughout the project. As a matter of policy, outside
contractors were hired when specific skills were required.
FIRST STEPS
As a pre-cursor to the full project a “Business Process Benchmarking Project” was carried out at
the Australasian head office during the first half of 1997. The FIST team used EntityRelationship-Diagramming and Data-Flow-Diagrams to analyze APCO’s business operations.
5

The names and sentences in quotes and italics are direct citations from APCO’s internal
documents and from interviews
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The outcome of these deliberations was an “Enquiry To Cash (ETC)” business model, destined to
serve as the single, globally standardized process of supply and demand management across all
APCO subsidiaries. The report also stated that APCO was spending approximately $ 80 million
on information systems per annum and predicted that this budget would need to increase if
systems were not common.
The first project strategy and plan for FIST foresaw the following main stages:
1. Development of a prototype system in co-operation with a site that was
reasonably representative for most of the Group’s offices and operations;
2. Implementation of the prototype in a small number of pilot sites; further
adaptation of the prototype to make it functional as a global system;
3. Gradual ‘roll-out’ of the ‘global system’ into selected regions.
Estimated completion milestone dates were early 1998, late 1998 and late 1999 respectively.
By the middle of 1996, the North American Region (NAR) started to embark on a review of its
information systems. Their old IBM system was becoming obsolete and the software was in need
of a functional upgrade. The South East Asia region was by then also embarking on a project to
upgrade their fragmented PC-based installations with a more coherent information systems
architecture to cope with the rapid growth the region was experiencing. Both sites thus became
natural candidates for the development of the prototype and also as pilot sites for further
implementation:
•

North America, with its large ingredients market, would become the prototype for APCO
offices serving this business sector;
• APCO’s South East Asia region (SEAR), which services a large consumer market, would
be a good prototype for all consumer and/or mixed business offices within APCO,
especially in the lesser developed economies.
FIST began in earnest with the dispatch of a team to North America in September of 1997.
THE FIRST PILOT SITES: NEW YORK AND KUALA LUMPUR
The North America Region saw the head office team as a welcome support for their upgrade and
replacement project and they were now keen to go ahead with it as fast as possible. The FIST
team agreed to February 1998 (some six months hence) as the date for going live with the new
North American system, as well as with the first global FIST pilot, which would be developed in
parallel, “capitalizing on the significant synergies in a common ETC model”.
At the same time Kuala Lumpur started the process of looking at their requirements. They
expected that the FIST team would undertake this task. They were quite concerned when the
FIST team restricted itself to comparing the ETC model they adapted for North America with
SEAR and found “a 90 - 95% match”. This action lead to heated discussions concerning the
feasibility of one common business process model for the two regions, given that their markets,
products, and business operations were entirely different. Serious reservations were expressed
about the generality and high-level nature of the model (“That fits everybody from the corner shop
to Disney” was one SEAR manager’s exasperated comment). After representations by Kuala
Lumpur to APCO’s executive board it was agreed that SEAR would go ahead and, “for the time
being”, carry out an “update of their existing application systems”. The SEAR general manager
later quietly extended the terms of reference to allow, “for the time being”, an upgrade of
equipment “to optimize the running of the updated software”. He was also critical of what he
called the “top-down-approach” taken by FIST. In return, FIST accused SEAR of bulldozing their
proposal for an independent information systems effort through the executive board, “jeopardizing
the global systems standard”.
By the end of 1997, North America was thus the only pilot site. Time pressure was beginning to
take its toll on the management style in the project: FIST management was now actively
discouraging user participation so that it could deliver a system by the February 1998 deadline.
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Excluding any further NAR input, they started to drive the requirements specification
predominantly from head office, using the ETC model as the basis for “engineering the new NAR
and global business processes”. In reaction, at a Finance conference in January 1998, North
America and the other regional managers issued a strongly worded memo demanding broadly
based involvement, to avoid wasting effort on a system which, they felt, would ultimately not
support their business.
FIST management complained to the CEO:
“The finance conference has attempted to change the rules with regard to FIST.
Prior to this, we were responsible [for developing the pilot] and we would keep
the other regions informed. Now it was suddenly ‘agreed’ that every man and his
dog would be involved. The FIST timetable cannot absorb this extra involvement
without bursting.”
This internal memo predicted that FIST would take twice as long and cost three times as much if
any more participation was allowed. The CEO sided with the FIST team and issued a strongly
worded executive circular demanding that the FIST project be “fully supported” by everyone.
As the North America pilot project was still aiming for the February 1998 deadline, two parallel
activity streams were developing:
•

The CEO called for a detailed cost benefit analysis. The FIST team put together a
justification report showing annual savings of $18m (by eliminating 200 jobs and reducing
upgrade costs) against $33m as the total cost of global systems implementation.
Including one-time savings of $6m, the report predicted a net-present-value of $20m over
the next five years, with a payback of less than two years.

•

With an eye on the February 1998 deadline, the highest priority for FIST management
was to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for software and hardware, to be used
internationally as the base for the global system.

THE GLOBAL REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP)
A mixed team from NAR and FIST was assembled during October 1997 at APCO’s head office to
produce a binding RFP for global software, hardware, communications and support, based on the
‘ETC model’ as the global operations standard. In early November, the RFP was sent to all the
regions to comment. The regions’ comments together with the reaction by the FIST team are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Regional Comments and FIST Reaction
Concerns and Comments

FIST Reaction/Action

The requirements for the Consumer and Food Service
(together approx. 60% of APCO’s business) are not
covered; examples of incongruences were given;

“The comments and examples of the Europe and
South East Asia regions were summarized and
inserted into the RFP as an addendum”;

The February 1998 deadline is unrealistic and unmaintainable;

“February 1998 remains unchanged”;

Since the systems and technology chosen will become
a global standard, the regions insisted strongly that
their participation in the evaluation and selection
process following the RFP is essential;

“Discussion will continue to ensure that we achieve a
reasonable balance of regional involvement without
impacting the timetable”;

The concept of common systems for [the Group’s]
“core information systems” is strongly questioned
(because of wide differences in the business) and was
explicitly rejected by key regional management.

A list of “core information systems” will be prepared for
Executive agreement and “everything non-core will be
left for the regions”.
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Faced with this level of resistance, the FIST team once more complained to the CEO. He sided
with them again, driving the message home even more forcefully: The head of the European
Region, whose memo to the CEO was particularly critical had it returned with a handwritten
remark “Next time you send me something like this don’t forget to attach your resignation to it”.
Thus FIST went ahead strongly. The RFP was finally issued in late December 1997. Replies
were solicited for the last week in January 1998, so that the selection could be concluded and so
that the FIST team could put together a capital expenditure proposal in early February 1998.
However, after every invited vendor raised strong concerns over this tight schedule for a very
substantial RFP, the deadline was set for March 1998.
The evaluation of the RFPs by the FIST team with some North America input was a difficult one,
involving many calls for more information from vendors. Eventually, in July 1998 ORACLE was
chosen as the main provider for data base middleware and ORACLE FINANCIALS and
INVERCROX6 (Manufacturing and Logistics) as the global applications software. No decision
was made on the hardware, the technical support proposals, or the communications technology.
Back in North America, the emphasis now switched from requirements analysis to the design of
the new system.
THE COMMON APPLICATION SYSTEMS ISSUE
Following on from FIST’s reply to their concerns over the global standard (Table 1), the regions in
April 1998 asked for a clarification of what precisely the FIST team meant by ‘common
information systems’. FIST avoided a response initially, but eventually initiated a separate
exercise in late 1998 and carried it out at APCO’s head office in Australasia. As a result, a list of
the core applications was assembled in February 1999. In it, the core and non-core applications
were determined according to the following definition:
• Core applications are “those which organizations participating in FIST must
implement in order to
(a) manage their business to meet required goals and objectives; and
(b) fully support the Five FIST Principles of business function placement; and
(c) meet the information needs of other units of the APCO group of
companies.”
• Non-core applications are “The internal workings of processes by which some
organizational outcomes are achieved are of no interest outside that
organization. When an organization chooses to use an automated application to
meet such needs, that application is considered to be non-core, no matter how
essential it may be to the delivery of the outcome”.
These definitions caused major discussions and brought on renewed, and ever more vociferous,
objections from the regions, who maintained that the definition of core applications was too wide.
The FIST Team, however, persisted with the definitions and confirmed the intended split between
the proposed “Core”, i.e. the global standard applications, compulsory for every regional and local
office, and the “Non-Core”, i.e. local, application systems. The Core and Non-Core applications,
together with an indication whether they were part of the standard FIST application packages are
listed in Table 2.
DEVELOPING THE NORTH AMERICA PROTOTYPE AND PILOT
Having taken until July (and not until February 1998, as originally planned) to reach the decision
to use the ORACLE/INVERCROX software as the Group’s standard application systems, in late
August 1998 the FIST team could now begin with the implementation of the software in the North
America region, and immediately encountered serious problems.

6
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Table 2. Core and Non-Core Applications within the FIST Architecture
Core Applications

Standard?

Non-Core Applications

Standard?

Inventory

INVERCROX

Manufacturing

INVERCROX

Purchasing

INVERCROX

Marketing

Sales

INVERCROX

Local Statutory Acct’s

General Ledger

ORACLE/FIN

Fixed Assets

Accounts Receivable

ORACLE/FIN

Treasury

Accounts Payable

ORACLE/FIN

Payroll

Import/Export

Project Management

The INVERCROX manufacturing and distribution modules would not conform with the business
processes they were selected to support. The FIST team responded with setting out a policy that
“where a choice existed between the change to business practice or a change to
the software system, the business practice will be changed by default”.
The North America regional manager, however, refused to change business practices which “had
been developed in response to market and operational requirements”. Furthermore, it turned out
that the software changes could only be carried out by INVERCROX and were estimated to cost
in the region of $2.5m.
Work on the ORACLE FINANCIAL software, too, did not progress as fast as was expected.
Internal politics within ORACLE International dictated that implementation support for NAR had to
come from ORACLE Australasia as the contract signatory – not from ORACLE’S worldwide
centre of excellence for financial software just across the East River from NAR’s main offices.
Further significant systems problems also arose. The new order processing systems, as a pivotal
element of the common ETC process, required globally standardized product and inventory
codes. A special sub-project was therefore set up in December 1998 to develop an integrated,
international product code schema. This effort, alas, turned out to be too complex for a “solution
within the scope of the FIST project at this time”. After six months, the sub-project was shelved in
mid 1999 and the issue was left unresolved.
Similar problems plagued the general accounting software suite, where another exercise was
started in early 1999 at APCO headquarters to create a common system of account codes,
suitable for all international subsidiaries. This six month effort resulted in a 55-digit account
number, with in-built logic to reflect the global chart-of-accounts. The solution was widely
opposed (and privately often ridiculed) by the regions. The scheme was abandoned altogether
after the European Region pointed out to the CEO that in most of continental Europe the chart of
accounts is prescribed by fiscal legislation and using ‘alternative’ accounts is a felony in France
and Germany.
In late 1999, therefore, the FIST project was nearly two years late and some $6.5m over budget.
To bring the project back on track, the FIST team suggested carrying out a “business-processreengineering (BPR)” project in North America in order to change NAR’s existing business
processes to conform with the ETC model. Once such a “vanilla ETC” was implemented in one
major region, it would subsequently become the norm for all the Group’s offices and would “once
and for all resolve continuous, disruptive and costly conflict over process details”.
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The BPR project, however, began to go wrong at its very inception. The FIST team insisted that
the object of the exercise was to change North America’s business processes so that they would
fit the ETC model. NAR, however, was expecting a collaborative project to improve the North
American operation. This conflict could not be resolved and caused continuing acrimonious
arguments between the FIST team and NAR management. No material progress was ever made
on the BPR project. In mid-2000 it was abandoned altogether.
The reason for the problems was that by mid-2000, NAR urgently needed to replace its now
obsolete information systems and technology – four years into trying to get it upgraded. This
work took first priority and led to a suspension of the FIST project in North America. The head of
the NAR managed to reach an agreement with the CEO that the “replacement software could in
the interim be installed so as to reflect the North America region’s requirements in the first
instances”.
By early 2001, North America established a stable computer system, using ORACLE FINANCIAL
software to North American specifications. After three more months of intensive lobbying, the
NAR management finally wrested agreement from the CEO that they were “no longer considered
the pilot project for FIST”. The FIST manager summed up the situation in a presentation to
APCO’s executive board:
“..the North America pilot...made it obvious that a global business cannot be
streamlined from a subsidiary perspective. It needed corporate focus, hence the
switch back to HQ. The time in North America was an extremely useful exercise
to proof the software and highlight areas that needed special attention.”
THE FIST PILOT IN TAJIKISTAN
In mid 2001, APCO decided to open a new office in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan (once a
Soviet Republic) to capitalize on their burgeoning trade with the former USSR and to establish
credentials in an influential sector of the Muslim market. With NAR a pilot site no more, the FIST
team decided to select Dushanbe as the new pilot site to test out the common global system for
APCO, even though the Tajikistan office “was only to have about a dozen people and probably
does not really need to computerize any of its local operations”, as stated by the office manager.
The ‘global standard’ (i.e. unmodified) ORACLE FINANCIAL and INVERCROX suite would be
installed first and business procedures would be defined around the systems. The first target
date for completion was January 2002.
However, for want of adequate local software and hardware support, the systems could not be
developed on site. It was therefore decided to develop the first prototype at the head office in
Australasia. This decision necessitated a complicated chain of communication and logistics, as
the local telecommunications were too unreliable for remote development operations. The
implementation was delayed in unpredictable ways and, by January 2002, the prototype was only
30% finished. Continual difficulties with implementing a computer system in an unsupported
environment and for unskilled users (who did not really want one) delayed the implementation of
the pilot system further, as did uncommon requirements such as the effects of Islamic banking
procedures on accounting processes. A much reduced ‘pilot’, the General Accounts suite, was
eventually handed over as a working system in September 2002.
FIST publicized this ‘achievement’ as a great success and announced that they intended to use it
as a model for FIST implementation in other small offices:
“In 2003…Hong Kong, South Africa, the Philippines and mainland China will be
next on the list”.
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DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING FIST AT HEAD OFFICE AND AT OTHER REGIONS
The major difficulties with the FIST project eventually began to attract the attention of the CEO,
who began to change his attitude towards it. He was especially alarmed about the significant
costs. By the end of 2001, FIST cost about $25m, had missed every deadline and had not
delivered any noticeable benefits.
Previously, the FIST team always managed to convince the CEO that the main obstructions to
FIST were essentially a “political’” response to his strategic moves towards re-establishing central
control over the regions, requiring nothing more than “a show of strength and a determination
right from the top [not to tolerate] any more games”. Although the CEO repeatedly pointed out to
the FIST team that his strategy was not a return to central control, he let himself be persuaded to
become FIST’s “major sponsor” and to issue draconian edicts to the regions to support FIST.
The NAR manager never knew how close he came to being sacked or demoted because of his
refusal to adopt the ETC version of the FIST-Prototype. Even executives at head office began to
regard any criticism of FIST as “a possible career-limiting move”.
In spite of this atmosphere, the regions were distancing themselves even further from the project.
The manager in charge of the Europe Region, an old school friend of the NAR manager and
therefore best informed about the problems with FIST, began covertly to canvass support for a
decisive move at the next regional executive meeting, which the CEO always chaired. Europe
region had the most advanced information systems, set-up to support their sophisticated
manufacturing and marketing operations in the UK and on the continent, as well as the steepest
technology differentials across the region. In Egypt, for example, carbon-paper in mechanical
typewriters was still at the heart of their business processes. Europe shared this broad spectrum
of process sophistication with Latin America, whose virtually paperless head office in Miami
presided over local offices in anything from huts in the pampas (albeit with satellite telephones) to
sprawling low-tech manufacturing facilities in Mexico City. Between them, Europe and NAR
started to build political support for a motion at the meeting that would force a corporate re-think
about FIST.
The motion was presented to the meeting in July 2002 and accepted on the spot. The concerted
and continuing rejection of FIST by his most able and trusted lieutenants eventually began to
seed strong doubts in the CEO. The move by the regions pointed to a way out of the situation
without loss of face for him. In August 2002 Deloitte Consulting were commissioned to evaluate
FIST, the ETC, and all the other related projects.
The Deloitte report, issued in November 2002 was fairly noncommittal, even mildly complimentary
and set out very positive recommendations, in the version for public consumption. The
“Executive Working Paper”, confidential to the CEO and a select group of regional executives,
however, was scathingly critical of all the FIST projects as being overly ambitious, technically
doubtful, and unjustifiable from a business perspective. Deloitte deemed FIST as simply not
achievable, neither within the stipulated time frame nor with the resources at hand, or through the
existing centralized project structure.
The Deloitte report proved to be a turning point. In APCO’s executive Board meeting of
December 20, 2002 the CEO re-assigned the whole IT portfolio - and with it the FIST project - to
Chris McElroy. As the CFO, Chris was one of the few outspoken and open critics of the project.
Advocating that business reasons, not global technology standards should convince APCO into
spending $25m, he called for a critical review of FIST as early as March 2002.
In rapid succession the FIST project manager and deputy manager resigned.
III. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
McElroy smiled thinly as he recalled the “sincere condolences” card he had received from the
Europe regional manager upon the news that he “inherited” the IT portfolio. But, he thought, if
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nothing else, this whole sorry episode should jolt the CEO and the head office executive into
taking IT seriously. He always cringed when one or other of the directors declared – with inverted
pride, it seemed - that “these computers are a complete mystery to me”.
Getting them off their farm bikes and onto a computer was one thing he would put on his agenda
first off, he mused. The other key priority would be to focus on healing the serious rifts that
developed as a result of the vicious politics FIST engendered.
But what to do about FIST itself? All misgivings about the project aside, is there or is there not a
real need for some more co-ordination, co-operation and synergy between all these diverse
computer systems? And if there is – how would one do something about it?
McElroy now regretted that he didn’t invite the head of the Deloitte review team (who impressed
him as a seasoned professional with lots of common sense) to help him with the London meeting.
He decided to get them involved, first thing, upon his return.
Author’s Note: The case is based on the history of an international information systems project in a real
enterprise. It was, however, simplified, altered, and adapted (by omission of detail) for use as an
instructional case. For this reason the enterprise requested to remain anonymous. Names, places and
temporal references were changed to disguise the enterprise. The author wishes to express his sincere
thanks for the open, helpful, and extended co-operation he received from “APCO” management and staff
around the globe.
Editor’s Note: This case was received on August 10, 2003. It was with the author for 2 months for 2
revisions. It was published on March 21, 2004.

APPENDIX 1.TIMELINE OF THE FIST PROJECT
Time

Project Activity

Early 1996

The new CEO introduces the new ‘transnational’ strategy of introducing
more central control over synchronized international marketing and
logistics operations.

Mid 1996

North America Region (NAR) reviews its aging IBM system. NAR is
chosen as ‘prototype’ site.
South East Asia Region (SEAR) needs to upgrade their fragmented PCbased installation to cope with rapid regional growth.

December 1996 to
January 1997

IS Department at APCO’s head office establishes the common global
‘Standard for Information Systems’ which becomes the ‘Charter’ for FIST,
the global project launched in January 1997. FIST Budget (for full global
implementation) is set at a cost of $35 million, supported by projected
benefits (predominantly clerical workforce savings) of $60 million

Early to Mid 1997

‘Business Process Benchmarking Project’ to develop the Enquiry To Cash
(ETC) concept prototype for all global business operations is carried out by
the FIST team at APCO’s head office.

Mid 1997

Both NAR and SEAR are chosen as pilot sites for FIST. A project team
starts work at the NAR head office. ‘Going-live’ date for the NAR pilot
system is set for February 1998.
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Time

Project Activity

Late 1997

FIST decides that SEAR will use the NAR pilot. A ‘Requirements
Benchmark’ comparison project between NAR and SEAR finds a 90-95%
match. SEAR points out it is in different markets with different products
than NAR, refuses to accept the ‘Benchmark’ results, and opts out of the
pilot.

October &
November 1997

A mixed team of NAR and FIST issues a global Request for Proposal
(RFP) using the ETC model as the basis for “engineering the new NAR
and global business processes” This proposal invokes strong criticism
from regional management, which the CEO strongly discourages. He
issues a strong edict to the regions to “fully support the project”

December 1997

RFP is issued virtually unchanged to selected vendors; a deadline for RFP
replies is set for January 1998, so that the selection of global technology
may still be completed by February 1998 (the original deadline for ‘goinglive’ with the NAR pilot). Most vendors object to the tight deadline

January 1998

At the APCO Group Finance conference all heads of the regions demand
involvement in FIST, which is refuted by FIST management; CEO sides
again with FIST and re-issues an even stronger edict to the regions to
“fully support the project[- or else]”

March 1998

Three vendor proposals are received for evaluation by the FIST.

April 1998

Regions demand explanation of what the “core information systems” are
that were mentioned in FIST’s reply to the regions concerns in January
1998

July 1998

RFP’s were evaluated and global standard technology is selected, based
on applications software from ORACLE and INVERCROX. No hardware
platform, support organisations, or communications vendors are selected;

Late 1998

INVERCROX functionality does not fit NAR business processes. FIST
demands NAR change their business practices. NAR management
refuses.
ORACLE insists on supporting the NAR pilot from its Australasian office,
not from its North America base in the same city as the NAR offices
“International Integrated Product Code” project started to harmonise all the
different (regional) product codes;

Early 1999

“Common Chart of Accounts” project launched to standardise the widely
different accounting structures used by APCO’s international subsidiaries

February 1999

FIST issues a definition of “core” and “non-core” information systems;
regional management unite in their objections to the scope of “core”
systems

Mid 1999

“International Integrated Product Code” project abandoned as being too
complex for a “solution within the scope of the FIST project at this time”;
“Common Chart of Accounts” project abandoned: in most of continental
Europe the chart of accounts is prescribed by fiscal legislation and using
‘alternative’ accounts is a felony in France and Germany.
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Time

Project Activity

Late 1999

FIST Project Costs exceed budget-to-date by $6.5 million.

231

“Business-Process-Reengineering (BPR)” project launched as a formal
process to change NAR’s existing business processes to conform with the
ETC model
Early 2000

NAR management oppose the BPR project; no progress is made on the
FIST pilot system while the discussions go on between NAR, FIST, and
the CEO

Mid 2000

NAR’s old IBM system is now obsolete and cannot be supported beyond
the end of 2000; NAR management reaches an agreement with the CEO
that the “replacement software could in the interim be installed so as to
reflect the North America region’s requirements in the first instances”

Early 2001

NAR goes live on a new IBM platform, using ORACLE FINANCIALS to
NAR specifications. CEO agrees that they are “no longer considered the
pilot project for FIST”

Mid 2001

APCO open the Dushanbe (Tajikistan) office. FIST declare Dushanbe as
the new FIST global pilot site. ‘Global Standard’ (i.e. unmodified) ORACLE
FINANCIAL and INVERCROX suites will be installed and business
procedures will be defined around the software. Completion deadline is
January 2002

January 2002

FIST Project costs stand at $25 million as at end 2001.
Dushanbe ‘Global Standard’ pilot (developed at APCO head office for want
of adequate local software and hardware support) is now 30% complete.
New completion deadline: June 2002

June to September
2002

After the June deadline is missed, requirements for the Dushanbe pilot
system are reduced to a kernel of “General Accounting” software. The pilot
system ‘goes live’ in September 2002

July/August 2002

Europe and NAR regional management present a motion to the Regional
Executive meeting that FIST be reviewed and suspended for the duration
of the review; CEO accepts the motion and commissions Deloitte
Consulting to review and evaluate FIST

November 2002

Deloitte Consulting report to CEO: “FIST is overly ambitious, technically
doubtful, unjustifiable from a business perspective, and unachievable
within timeframe”;

December 2002

CEO and APCO’s executive board re-assign the FIST project to come
under the CFO. Management of FIST resigns. Scope of FIST changed to
the “development of a global information systems strategic plan”.;
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation

Explanation

APCO

Australasian Produce Co-Operative

BPR

FMCG

“Business-Process-Reengineering” project launched as a formal
process to change NAR’s existing business processes to conform
with the ETC model
the ‘Enquiry To Cash’ concept prototype for all global business
operations
‘Food Information Systems and Technology’ project to create a
global information system for APCO; the term is used
interchangeably for the project as well as its management
Fast-Moving-Consumer-Goods

NAR

APCO’s North America Region

ProdCos

‘Production Companies’; the 38 production co-operatives in which
Australasia’s 25,000 primary producers held shares in proportion
to their production. The ProdCos, in turn, hold shares in APCO,
in proportion to their production
APCO’s South East Asia Region

ETC
FIST

SEAR
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